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Several studies have shown detrimental effects of alcohol on post-error adjustments. In
contrast to previous studies, which focused on only one aspect of post-error adaptive
behavior, we compared the effect of alcohol and placebo on post-error slowing (PES),
post-error reduction of interference (PERI) and post-error improvement of accuracy (PIA).
Moreover, we used a between-subjects design (N = 45) comparing a control condition
to both an alcohol and an alcohol-placebo condition as to disentangle physiological and
expectancy effects of alcohol. In a standard Stroop congruency task, we found that
intoxicated participants as well as participants with the incorrect belief of being intoxicated
showed significant decreased PES compared to a control group. Furthermore, we found
evidence for a condition-independent post-error increase of interference and post-error
decrease of accuracy. The underlying mechanisms of the post-error adaptation effects are
discussed in terms of the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009).
Keywords: alcohol, placebo, post-error slowing, post-error reduction of interference, post-error improvement of
accuracy, orienting account
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control is the ability to detect difficulties and errors
and to adjust our information processing system in order to
optimize future action outcomes. A meta-analysis of Steele and
Southwick (1985) suggests that alcohol typically impairs perfor-
mance on tasks that involve cognitive control. More specifically,
they demonstrated that alcohol has a detrimental effect in sit-
uations with simultaneous activation of conflicting responses
(i.e., response conflict).
In the lab, conflict processing is typically investigated using
congruency tasks, where irrelevant information may or may not
interfere with response selection. In a Stroop task, for instance,
participants have to respond on the basis of the color of a color-
word, while the meaning of the word is irrelevant (Stroop, 1935).
Participants are generally faster and more accurate on congruent
(word GREEN in green ink) than on incongruent trials (word
RED in green ink). Importantly, Curtin and Fairchild (2003)
observed that, compared to a control group, intoxicated partic-
ipants were slower and less accurate on incongruent trials, but
not on congruent trials, suggesting impaired conflict processing
for intoxicated participants.
Conflict processing, which takes place on incongruent trials,
has been localized in posterior mediofrontal cortex (pMFC). One
influential theory holds that pMFC monitors for the occurrence
of conflict, after which the need for cognitive control is signaled
(Botvinick et al., 2001). A role for pMFC in conflict detection
has been confirmed by a large number of brain imaging stud-
ies, showing increased pMFC activity on incongruent trials (e.g.,
Kerns et al., 2004; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Carter and van Veen,
2007). Interestingly, alcohol intake led to decreased pMFC activity
on incongruent trials (Marinkovic and Azma, 2010; Marinkovic
et al., 2011), explaining the selective deficit for incongruent trials.
More important for the present study, the pMFC is also involved
in the detection of errors and subsequent behavioral adjustments.
Several studies have reported a correlation between pMFC activ-
ity and post-error adaptations (Gehring et al., 1993; Kerns et al.,
2004;Wessel andUllsperger, 2011). Interestingly, alcohol seems to
decrease error-related activity in pMFC: the error-related negativ-
ity (ERN), an electrophysiological component related to pMFC
activation (Gehring et al., 1993), was found to be reduced after
alcohol consumption (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; Bartholow et al.,
2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that alcohol would
also yield impaired post-error adaptation effects. Surprisingly,
this has not been tested systematically.
In the error literature, three post-error adaptation effects have
been reported for which different theoretical accounts have been
described (for a review, see Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011).
First, post-error slowing (PES; Rabbitt, 1966) refers to the find-
ing that participants typically slow down after making an error. It
has been suggested that PES reflects a strategy shift where partici-
pants deliberately slow down in order to decrease error likelihood
in following trials (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). According to
this account, errors will also be detected by the conflict mon-
itoring system, in turn triggering enhanced attentional control.
Alternatively, the orienting account by Notebaert et al. (2009)
frames PES as an orienting reaction to infrequent errors, slowing
down the following response. In line with this view, Notebaert
et al. (2009) predicted that slowing would occur after an infre-
quent event, irrespective of the nature of that event (incorrect
or correct answer). Accordingly, their results showed PES in the
condition where errors were low in frequency, and post-correct
slowing in the condition where errors were high frequent (see
also Houtman et al., 2011). Second, it has been shown that
participants’ congruency effects are smaller following an error
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(post-error reduction of interference, PERI; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2002). This effect is explained by the cognitive control account
as reflecting increased attentional focusing after an erroneous
response. However, the orienting account does not predict such
effect, since it is presumed that attention is directed away from
the task after an error. The orienting account therefore predicts
an inverse PERI effect. Finally, post-error increase in accuracy
(PIA) is the finding that accuracies are higher after errors than
after correct trials (e.g., Laming, 1968; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008;
Danielmeier et al., 2011; Seifert et al., 2011). PIA is predicted by
the cognitive control account: control is increased after an error
and therefore fewer errors are committed. However, some stud-
ies have failed to find increased accuracy following errors (e.g.,
Hajcak et al., 2003; Hajcak and Simons, 2008; King et al., 2010)
or even observed a post-error accuracy decrease (e.g., Rabbitt and
Rodgers, 1977; Fiehler et al., 2005), which is more in line with the
orienting account.
To date, only two studies reported the effect of alcohol on post-
error behavioral adaptations, focusing only on the PERI effect.
These studies showed a smaller PERI effect in an alcohol group,
compared to a placebo group (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002) and a
control group (Bartholow et al., 2011). No study examined alco-
hol effects on PES or PIA. The goal of our study was therefore to
investigate the effect of alcohol on error adaptation more thor-
oughly. Unlike Ridderinkhof et al. (2002) and Bartholow et al.
(2011), who only looked at PERI, we wanted to compare the
effect of alcohol on PES, PERI, and PIA by making use of a
standard congruency task. The fact that these three effects can
be analyzed in one and the same task is an ideal situation to
obtain knowledge about the specific ways alcohol affects cognitive
processing.
We used a design that enabled us to separate the physiological
and psychological effects of alcohol. The balanced placebo design
(Marlatt and Rohsenow, 1980) is a 2 × 2 design consisting of
two dichotomous factors: beverage manipulation and correctness
of information. The beverage manipulation factor determined
whether a participant had to drink an alcoholic or a non-alcoholic
beverage. Correctness of information determined whether the
person was correctly informed about his drinks or not (right or
wrong). For ethical reasons, we did not incorporate an alcohol
group that was told that they were not drinking alcohol. The
alcohol-placebo condition, in which participants believed they
were drinking alcohol but were in fact not, is enough to dissociate
physiological from psychological effects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-five healthy male participants (18–38 years old,M = 20.84,
SD = 3.23) participated in this study. They were non-smokers
and did not use medication or drugs. All participants had a
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. In order to ensure the
alcohol would have a similar effect on all participants, we only
used “social drinkers” who drink on average between the 1.8 and
3.5 standard drinks a day (or 12.6–24.5 a week). Participants
were paid for their participation and gave their permission prior
to each experimental session by filling in informed consents
approved by the ethical committee.
DESIGN
The double-blind balanced placebo design of Marlatt and
Rohsenow (1980) with three groups was used. All participants
were randomly distributed over the groups. The first condition
(N = 15) was the alcohol group (M = 19.53 years, SD = 1.25
years). They had to drink alcohol and were correctly informed.
The second condition (N = 15) was the control group (M = 22.8
years, SD = 4.52 years). They had to drink a beverage without
alcohol and were also correctly informed. The third condition
(N = 15) was the alcohol-placebo group (M = 20.2 years, SD =
2.08 years). They were informed that they were receiving alcohol
but in reality the beverage contained no alcohol.
PROCEDURE
Consent and screening
Participants were asked not to use drugs or alcohol 24 h before
the start of the experiment. They were also asked to abstain
from drinking and eating 4 h in advance. The experiment always
started at 13 or 15 h in the afternoon to avoid effects of the
circadian rhythm. They were also asked to sign a document in
which they gave their permission to stay at the faculty until their
intoxication level was lower than the legally permitted level. In
their first session, participants also had to fill in two question-
naires regarding their average alcohol consumption in daily life:
the AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993) and the Timeline follow-back
questionnaire (Sobell and Sobell, 1992).
Beverage manipulation
The alcohol manipulation was based on Ridderinkhof et al.
(2002). In the alcohol condition, participants had to drink two
cups containing 0.55 g alcohol in total. Dependent on parameters
like weight and alcohol tolerance, an intake of 0.55 g/kg alcohol
results in a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 80 mg/100ml
(= 0.7–0.8‰). By means of the formula of Widmark (Watson
et al., 1981), it was determined how much vodka was needed in
order to achieve a BAC of 80 mg/100ml. This formula predicts
the BAC with a number of parameters (for the exact formula,
see Watson et al., 1981). We chose vodka because of its high
alcohol concentration (37.5% alcohol), making it unnecessary to
use more than two cups (in contradiction to beer or wine). The
vodka was equally distributed in two identical cups. In each cup,
green peppermint syrup (with a quantity of 75% of the amount
of vodka) was added. This peppermint syrup made it impossible
for the participants to taste the presence of alcohol in the cups.
Furthermore, the cups were supplemented with orange juice until
each cup contained 400ml of liquid. A cover was put on each
cup and participants had to drink the cocktail with a reed. In
the placebo condition, the participant had to drink two 400ml
cups which contained only orange juice and mint syrup. The
calculation of the amount of peppermint syrup was exactly the
same as in the alcohol session. Thus, the only difference between
the alcohol and placebo conditions was the presence of vodka.
Participants’ BAC was measured at their arrival to verify that they
were completely sober and started the experiment with a BAC of
zero. The drinking part of each experimental session consisted of
three phases. The first 20min, participants had to drink the first
cup of 400ml. They were asked to drink at a regular rate. The
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next 20min, they had to drink the second cup of 400ml. Finally,
there was a waiting period of 20min in order to give the alcohol
the time to spread in the blood and have its physiological effect.
The second BAC measurement was right before the start of the
task. Furthermore, there were also measurements after every two
blocks of the experimental task.
Task
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor with a distance of
50 cm between the screen and the participant. The experiment
was programmed with T-scope software (Stevens et al., 2006).
Stroop stimuli consisted of four color words (RED, GREEN,
BLUE, or YELLOW), presented in red, green, blue, or yellow
ink. Participants were instructed to respond to the ink color of
the stimulus by pressing an associated button of a response box.
Response mapping of colors was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. The instructions at the beginning of the experiment
highlighted the importance of memorizing the response mapping
and these instructions were repeated between every block. A trial
started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500ms. Next,
a stimulus word appeared and the participant had to react as fast
and accurately as possible. The maximum response time was lim-
ited to 1500ms. In order to avoid people forgetting the response
mapping, feedback was given after every trial. A correct response
was followed by the letter “J,” an incorrect response by the let-
ter “F” and a too slow response by the letter “T.” The meaning of
these letters was also explained in the instructions. Participants
had to perform 10 blocks of 100 trials each. The first block was
considered a practice block and would not be included in the
analyses afterward. Each block was randomized and consisted of
50 congruent trials and 50 incongruent trials.
RESULTS
QUESTIONNAIRES
The purpose of the questionnaires was to check if the three bev-
erage conditions did not differ from each other with regard to
alcohol usage in daily life. The three conditions did not signifi-
cantly differ on the AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993), F(2, 42) < 1,
and the Timeline follow-back questionnaire (Sobell and Sobell,
1992), F(2, 42) < 1.
ALCOHOL MANIPULATION
Because this experiment has a between-subjects design, the fol-
lowing analyses only concern the 15 persons in the alcohol group.
At their arrival at the lab, all participants were completely sober
(BAC = 0mg/100ml). Just before the start of the task, the aver-
age BAC was M = 92.6 (SD = 20.5) mg/100ml. After two, four,
six, eight, and ten blocks, it was respectively M = 98.7 (SD =
19.5), M = 101.8 (SD = 19.2), M = 101.9 (SD = 20.5), M =
100.7 (SD = 21.3), and M = 99.5 (SD = 20) mg/100ml. One
hour after they finished the task, the alcohol concentration of
most participants fluctuated around 0.5‰.
In the post-questionnaire, all participants in the alcohol group
indicated they were sure that they were drinking alcohol. In the
control group, all participants were sure they were not drinking
alcohol. Most importantly, all 15 participants in the alcohol-
placebo group seemed to have believed they had been drinking an
alcoholic beverage. This showed that the manipulation was suc-
cessful and we could make valid conclusions about the different
conditions.
POST-ERROR ADJUSTMENTS
The practice block and the first trial of each experimental block
were removed. Next, responses that exceeded the maximum
response limit (1.4%) and incorrect responses were excluded
(8.4%). An outlier removal criterion of two SDs, calculated per
participant and per congruency, was used (removal of 4.86%).
The data were aggregated on the mean.
RT
A repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subject variables
previous accuracy (correct or incorrect) and current congruency
(congruent or incongruent) and the between-subject variable
beverage condition (alcohol, placebo, or control) was conducted
on mean RTs. Two participants showed a low number of obser-
vations (i.e., <5) in one cell of the repeated-measures ANOVA
for this analysis. However, excluding these two participants did
not change the overall pattern of results. The results based on all
participants are reported.
The main effect of current congruency was significant,
F(1, 42) = 101.96, p < 0.001, r = 0.84, indicating that people
were faster on congruent trials (578ms) than on incongruent tri-
als (644ms). The interaction between the congruency effect and
condition was not significant, F(2, 42) = 1.39, p > 0.1, r = 0.25.
The main effect of condition was also not significant, F(2, 42) < 1,
p > 0.1, r = 0.18.
PES. The main effect of previous accuracy was significant,
F(1, 42) = 68.81, p < 0.001, r = 0.79, indicating that participants
were slower after an error than after a correct response (i.e.,
PES; see Figure 1). Furthermore, the interaction between previ-
ous accuracy and condition also turned out significant, F(2, 42) =
3.89, p < 0.05, r = 0.39, indicating that PES differed significantly
between the conditions, while PES was significant in all condi-
tions (all ps < 0.001). Contrast analyses revealed that the control
group showed a significantly larger PES effect (79.52ms) than the
FIGURE 1 | Displays the difference in RT (in ms) between trials
following incorrect and correct responses (post-error slowing) for the
alcohol, alcohol-placebo, and control group. Error bars represent 95%
between-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
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FIGURE 2 | Displays the congruency effect (incongruent–congruent)
in ms for trials following correct and incorrect responses for the
alcohol, alcohol-placebo, and control group. Error bars represent 95%
within-subjects confidence intervals based on the mean square error term
of the interaction between previous accuracy and condition (Loftus and
Masson, 1994).
alcohol group (38.97ms), F(1, 28) = 6.92, p < 0.05, r = 0.44, and
a marginally significant larger PES effect than the alcohol-placebo
group (42.93ms), F(1, 28) = 3.95, p = 0.057, r = 0.35. There was
no difference between the alcohol group and the alcohol-placebo
group, F(1, 28) < 1.
PERI. We found an interaction between previous accuracy
and current congruency, F(1, 42) = 5.76, p < 0.05, r = 0.35. As
depicted in Figure 2, the congruency effect was larger follow-
ing errors (77.97ms) than following correct trials (54.15ms; i.e.,
post-error increase of interference). This reversed PERI effect did
not interact with condition, F(2, 42) < 1, p > 0.1, r = 0.19.
Accuracy
A repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subject variables
previous accuracy and current congruency and the between-
subject variable condition was conducted on mean error rates.
Overall, the error rate was on average 8.5% (SD = 5.7%). No
main effect of condition was found, F(2, 42) < 1, p > 0.1, r =
0.15, indicating that the differences in PES across conditions
were not due to different error frequencies. A main effect of cur-
rent congruency was found, F(1, 42) = 11.72, p < 0.001, r = 0.47,
showing that participants were more accurate on congruent tri-
als (7.1%) than on incongruent trials (8.4%). The interaction
between current congruency and condition was not significant,
F(2, 42) < 1, p > 0.1, r = 0.13.
PIA. The main effect of previous accuracy was significant,
F(1, 42) = 11.73, p < 0.001, r = 0.47, indicating that participants
were less accurate after an error (12.21%) than after a correct
response (7.97%, see Figure 3). The interaction between previ-
ous accuracy and condition was not significant, F(2, 42) = 1.20,
p > 0.1, r = 0.23.
PERI. The interaction between previous accuracy and congru-
ency turned outmarginally significant, F(1, 42) = 3.16, p = 0.083,
r = 0.26, indicating a larger congruency effect after an error than
after a correct response. There was again no interaction between
FIGURE 3 | Displays the difference in error rates (in %) between
trials following incorrect and correct responses (with positive
values indicating post-error accuracy decrease) for the alcohol,
alcohol-placebo, and control group. Error bars represent 95%
between-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
previous accuracy, congruency and condition, F(2, 42) = 1.68,
p ≥ 0.1, r = 0.27.
DISCUSSION
The first goal of our study was to perform a more compre-
hensive investigation of the effects of alcohol on post-error
behavioral adaptation. Interestingly, results showed a significant
condition-dependent PES effect: PES was smaller in both the
alcohol and alcohol-placebo group than in the control group.
Furthermore, contrary to the results of Ridderinkhof et al. (2002)
and Bartholow et al. (2011) reporting a condition-dependent
PERI effect, we observed a reversed PERI effect (i.e., a larger
congruency effect following errors) that did not differ between
groups. Similarly, we observed decreased accuracy following
errors, independent of condition.
PES
The observation that PES decreased in both the alcohol and
the alcohol-placebo group supports an explanation in terms of
expectancy effects: the performance of someone who beliefs to be
intoxicated resembles the performance of someone who is actu-
ally intoxicated. It is important to note that the error rates in
the different alcohol conditions did not differ significantly. If this
would have been the case, the condition-dependent PES effect
could be the result of the negative correlation between error rates
and PES: the higher the error rate, the lower PES (Houtman et al.,
2011). However, it appears that alcohol expectancy reduces the
saliency of errors, perhaps because one expects to make more
errors. This can be interpreted within the orienting account,
which predicts that slowing will occur after an infrequent event,
irrespectively of the nature of that event. The expectation to com-
mit more errors intoxicated or under the impression of being
intoxicated seems to have the effect that an error is no longer
perceived as a surprising event.
PERI/PIA
Whereas a cognitive control account would assume an increased
focus on the task following errors, reflected in a reduced
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congruency effect, we found an enhanced congruency effect
on post-error trials. This finding seems more consistent with
the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009), which argues
that errors or error-related processes interfere with the task at
hand.
In line with this prediction, we observed reduced accuracy fol-
lowing errors, as was also observed in Rabbitt and Rodgers (1977)
and Fiehler et al. (2005). Desmet et al. (2012), however, recently
demonstrated that in a more complex, mental arithmetic task,
PIA can be observed.
Although the orienting account can capture decreased accu-
racy and increased congruency effects after errors, it would
also predict an interaction with alcohol group, in the sense
that both effects should depend on error expectancy. The fact
that both effects are independent of alcohol condition, sug-
gests that increased error rates and congruency effects follow-
ing errors are unrelated to the mechanism(s) responsible for
PES. Such dissociation between the three post-error adapta-
tion effects has already been reported in the literature. For
instance, De Bruijn et al. (2004) demonstrated that lorezepam,
a GABAA-inducing drug, had a selective negative effect on
PERI, but not on PES. Recently, King et al. (2010) also
showed that PES and PERI are mediated by different neural
structures.
Taken together, our data allow for two important conclusions.
First, alcohol and alcohol expectancy decrease PES. Although it
is theoretically possible that this reduction in PES is caused by
different factors (one physiological and one psychological, for
instance), the most parsimonious explanation is that both groups
show reduced PES because they both expect reduced perfor-
mance, and hence increased error rates. Several recent studies
have indicated that increased error rates decrease PES, presum-
ably because errors become less salient when more errors are
made (Houtman et al., 2011). Following the same logic, we argue
that the expectation of making more errors also reduces the
saliency of errors. Second, our data support previous studies that
concluded that PES, PERI, and PIA are not caused by one and the
same mechanism (e.g., King et al., 2010), as alcohol and alcohol
expectancy only influences PES and not PERI or PIA.
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